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WHO ARE THE PARENTS OF 
BIOTECHNOLOGICAL CIDLDREN? 
Larry I. Palmer* 
We do not underestimate the difficulties of legislating on this subject. 
In addition to the inevitable confrontation with the ethical and moral 
issues involved, there is the question of the wisdom and effectiveness of 
regulating a matter so private, yet of such public interest. Legislative 
consideration of surrogacy may also provide the opportunity to begin to 
focus on the overall implications of the new reproductive biotechnol-
ogy-in vitro fertilization, preservation of sperms and eggs, embryo 
implantation and the like. The problem is how to enjoy the benefits of the 
technology-especially for infertile couples-while minimizing the risk 
of abuse. The problem can be addressed only when society decides what 
its values and objectives are in this troubling, yet promising, area. 1 
From 1990-1994, a Special Committee on Biotechnology and the Law of 
the New York State Bar Association was charged with developing legislative 
recommendations to deal with the complexities alluded to in the highly 
publicized Baby M case.2 In that case, the New Jersey Supreme Court held 
* Larry I. Palmer is Professor of Law, Cornell University School of Law. A 
version of a portion of this article was published as The Legal Significance of 
Gestation, CORNELL LAW FORUM July, 1993, at 9. 
I. In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396,469, 537 A.2d 1227, 1264 (1988). 
2. The full text of the committee's charge was: 
The Special Committee on Biotechnology and the Law shall examine the impact of 
advancements in biotechnology on existing laws and constitutional rights and 
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that surrogate parenting contracts were void and unenforceable. The 
committee, which I chaired, developed three specific legislative recommen-
dations. Although none have been approved by the House of Delegates of the 
New York State Bar Association, some reflections on their content and the 
process by which they were arrived at may provide insights into what 
legislation should be enacted in response to the use of in vitro fertilization. 
My approach to drafting legislation on this subject was guided by an 
assumption that no piece of comprehensive legislation for any particular form 
of reproductive technology should emerge from the committee's delibera-
tions. Deep value conflicts existed within the group. Members differed in 
terms of areas of professional practice, religious beliefs, political affiliations, 
and views on related issues of abortion. I believed that the differences were 
socially useful and ought to be presented in any legislative proposals. So the 
committee's process sought to find areas of commonality within a diverse 
group. 
My thinking, enriched by the debates within the committee, evolved by 
asking three questions about in vitro fertilization. After sketching these 
questions and the committee's general response, I shall examine each issue 
and the related proposals in more detail. 
First, I asked whether the existing legislative approach to the use of 
another reproductive technology-artificial insemination-should provide a 
model for developing a legislative approach to in vitro fertilization. In this 
regard, our 1990 report concluded that for legislative purposes the two 
biotechnologies are similar. 
The biological differences in the reproductive capacities of men and 
women led me to the next question, whether gestation of a child should make 
a woman a parent even when the genetic material of the embryo is provided 
by another woman. In 1992, the committee recommended that there be 
explicit legislative recognition that the practice of embryo implantation could 
prohibitions, specifically in relation to in vitro fertilization, surrogacy, patenting 
medical processes, donor insemination, gamete donation, genetic manipulation, 
cryopreservation, and all other related issues pertaining to the right to procreate, and 
to render a report and recommendations to the President, Executive Committee, and 
House of Delegates of the New York State Bar Association. 
Although I rely heavily on three of the Committee's written reports, of which I was 
the principal draftsperson, the views expressed here are my own. See REPORT ON 
GAMETE DONATION AND IN VITRO FERTILIZATION OF THE SPECIAL COMMITIEE ON 
BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW (1990); THIRD REPORT ON THE LEGAL SIGNIFI-
CANCE OF GESTATION OF THE SPECIAL COMMITIEE ON BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE 
LAW (1992); FOURTH REPORT ON THE PARENTS OF CHILDREN BORN THROUGH 
ASSISTED REPRODUCTION OF THE SPECIAL COMMITIEE ON BIOTECHNOLOGY AND 
THE LAW (1993). 
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lead to the situation where a child born of the practice of in vitro fertilization 
would have two legal mothers. 
Shortly after our 1992 report, New York enacted legislation prohibiting 
"surrogate parenting contracts" as contrary to public policy. As a result, I 
asked if our two-legal-mothers solution could not lead implicitly to a new 
definition of children within the law-"biotechnological children." Although 
the committee could not agree on a legislative solution to the two-mothers 
problem, we agreed that our proposal had created still another problem: how 
to handle inheritance. The final recommendation contained in our 1993 
report was that where the issue was determining relationships for purposes 
of inheritance law, the genetic as opposed to the gestational or birth mother 
was the parent. 
The degree of indeterminacy in some of the recommendations that follow 
may be a function of the cautious approach I believe law should adopt 
towards technology, particularly reproductive technology. Or, it may be an 
example of how the use of various technologies has forced law to develop 
new implicit legal and social constructs such as "biotechnological children" 
in order to permit an evolution of values around various conceptions of 
family formation. 
I. ARE ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION AND IN VITRO 
FERTILIZATION SIMILAR TECHNOLOGIES? 
After months of debate, the committee relied upon the statutory 
framework used to resolve what had become a less controversial biotechnolo-
gy-artificial insemination. The committee recommended a modification of 
that portion of the Domestic Relations Law which deals with artificial 
insemination, to provide children born with the help of in vitro fertilization 
with the same protection-legitimacy-as children born with the help of 
artificial insemination. We proposed that the pertinent statute, § 73(1) of the 
Domestic Relations Law, be expanded to encompass in vitro fertilization. As 
modified, the statute would read: 
Any child born to a married woman by means of artificial insemination or in 
vitro fertilization performed by persons duly authorized to practice medicine 
and with the consent in writing of the woman and her husband, shall be 
deemed the legitimate, natural child of the husband and his wife for all purposes~ 
3. The existing statute reads: 
§ 73 Legitimacy of child born by artificial insemination. 
(1) Any child born to a married woman by means of artificial insemination performed 
by persons duly authorized to practice medicine and with the consent in writing of the 
woman and her husband, shall be deemed the legitimate, natural child of the husband 
and his wife for all purposes. 
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Early legal controversies over the use of artificial insemination arose first 
in the context of marital dissolution, and then in the context of adoption. A 
variety of legal theories were used to resolve these cases prior to the 
enactment of§ 73 of the Domestic Relations Law.4 Then, in 1974, the New 
York Legislature passed § 73, which provided a single framework for 
resolving the issues related to custody, visitation, child support, and 
adoption. In declaring that a child born with the assistance of this biotechnol-
ogy was legally the child of a married couple for all purposes, the legislature 
seems to have recognized that a process which allows for the separation of 
what we might call "genetic" parentage from "social" parentage is best dealt 
with through legal recognition of the social parentage in the context of 
preexisting legal obligations to children. While this approach has not 
resolved all issues associated with the process of artificial insemination,5 it 
does provide a way of thinking about legal responses to new issues that may 
arise in regard to the use of this procedure. 
The committee agreed that the approach to artificial insemination should 
be used as a framework for in vitro fertilization as well. The committee had 
long, intense discussions on the ethical dilemmas associated with the process 
of in vitro fertilization, such as balancing the desires of infertile couples 
against the fear of the social consequences of separating fertilization from the 
sexual conduct of the man and woman who intend to raise a child. The 
committee concluded that neither the total prohibition of in vitro fertilization, 
nor legislative action to encourage and expand the use of in vitro fertiliza-
tion, is appropriate at this time. 
A total ban on the use of in vitro fertilization is inappropriate for at least 
two reasons. First, the constitutionality of a total prohibition of in vitro 
fertilization that includes married couples is questionable. In Griswold v. 
Connecticut,6 the Supreme Court granted to married couples a constitutional 
right to use contraceptive devices to prevent them from having children. 
Married couples ought to have a constitutional right to use biotechnology to 
assist them in having children. 7 
(2) The aforesaid written consent shall be executed and acknowledged by both the 
husband and wife and the physician who performs the technique shall certify that he 
had rendered the service. 
N.Y. Dom. Rei. Law§ 73 (McKinney 1988). 
4. See Strnad v. Strnad, 109 Misc. 786,78 N.Y.S.2d (Sup. Ct. (1948); Gursky 
v. Gursky, 39 Misc.2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963); In reAdoption of 
Anonymous, 74 Misc.2d 99, 105 345 N.Y.S.2d 430, 435 (Sur. Ct. 1973). 
5. See Mother Accuses Sperm Bank of a Mix-up, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1990, 
at B1 (describing a malpractice suit for an alleged mishandling of a husband's sperm 
preserved at a sperm bank for later impregnation of his wife). 
6. 381 u.s. 479 (1965). 
7. The analysis used in resolving abortion disputes also would be relevant to 
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Second, some infertile married couples have been and are using in vitro 
fertilization. Given the capacity of medicine to perform certain techniques 
such as cryopreservation of fertilized embryos, there might be conflicts that 
will have to be resolved. In our view, the most important anticipated 
conflicts for the legislature to resolve will be those that relate to the welfare 
of children born of this process. As to any such children, regardless of 
genotype, our proposed statute would provide a means of resolving any 
anticipated disputes about children involving married couples, who are now 
the most common users of in vitro fertilization procedures. Thus our statute 
provides a framework for resolving issues of responsibilities and obligations 
to the child in the event of divorce, adoption, or death of one or both 
parents. In addition, our proposed statute provides a means of resolving 
questions that may arise in the not-too-distant future. If, for instance, a 
married couple with a propensity to produce offspring with a severe genetic 
defect chose to accept the donation of a "healthy" embryo from another 
couple with "spare embryos," our proposed statute would help resolve 
disputes over the child. Under our proposed statute, the child born of the 
married woman who gave birth to the child under these circumstances would 
be the child of the married woman and her husband. The gamete donors 
would have no legal claim to visitation, no right to consent to the adoption 
of the child, and no right to inherit from the child. 
In providing a legal solution for problems that may arise if gamete or 
embryo donation is used by married couples to have children, I do not mean 
to suggest that gamete or embryo donation is desirable. Rather, I recognize 
that the desire to have a child, especially among those who are infertile, is 
an intense wish that may encourage some couples who are desperate for 
children to enter legally uncharted waters. Married couples started to use 
artificial insemination, despite the ethical controversy over the process and 
the well-known legal risks to the children in the event of divorce. Judges 
tried to handle the disputes regarding artificial insemination as they arose, 
by developing theories aimed at protecting children, until the legislature was 
finally able to adopt a consistent legal framework. In a similar fashion, over 
the past decade, married couples have started to use in vitro fertilization 
despite the deep ethical controversy over the technique. Like the users of 
artificial insemination before them, infertile couples, who have usually tried 
many other techniques before attempting in vitro fertilization, are likely to 
assume that there will be no disputes involving their children, or that the risk 
resolving these constitutional questions. That analysis may be changing. See Webster 
v. Reproductive Health Services et al., 492 U.S. 490 (1989); Planned Parenthood of 
S.E. Penn. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). 
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of dispute is worth taking. In this regard, infertile couples are no different 
than couples who have children through sexual intercourse. 
The proposed statute deliberately does not address whether single persons 
should have access to in vitro fertilization or artificial insemination.8 The 
issue of whether law should sanction the use of in vitro fertilization is 
distinct from the issue of who should have access to the biotechnology. Our 
resolution of the first issue allows the use of a biotechnology within the 
accepted legal framework for procreation and family formation (marriage). 
Thus, in vitro fertilization can be considered an extension of the already 
accepted use of reproductive technology (artificial insemination) by infertile 
couples. The second issue, allowing access to single persons, demands an 
examination of the assumptions which underlie the existing normative 
framework of marriage, and an analysis of whether and how uses of 
biotechnology may or should lead to a modification of that framework. This 
broader and more difficult issue may or may not need to be resolved at this 
time.9 
II. IS GESTATION LEGALLY SIGNIFICANT? 
In Johnson v. Calvert, 10 the California courts ruled that the genetic 
mother was the only legal mother of a child born of a surrogate who had 
been implanted with the embryo from the genetic mother and her husband. 
In light of this decision, the committee revisited the issues examined in its 
8. During our discussions, it became apparent that a small number of single 
women have been artificially inseminated in New York, and it is possible that some 
single and infertile women may seek to use in vitro fertilization in the future. 
9. The legislature may have greater latitude to regulate the use of in vitro 
fertilization by single persons than by married couples. The present normative 
structure for raising children, implicit in law, is a woman and a man as a married 
couple. The greater constitutional latitude in regard to a single person's access to 
reproductive technology exists even if one believes that a single person enjoys some 
constitutional protection to engage in voluntary sexual activity with another single 
person. Although one leading commentator argues that a person has a constitutional 
right to have access to non-coital means of reproduction, others reject this analysis. 
See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("If the right to privacy means 
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free of unwarranted 
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the 
decision whether to bear or beget a child."); John A. Robertson, Embryos, Families, 
and Procreative Liberty: the Legal Structure of the New Reproduction, 59 So. CAL. 
L. REV. 939 (1986); Alexander Morgan Capron & M.J. Radin, Choosing Family 
Law Over Contract Law as a Paradigm for Surrogate Motherhood, 16 LAW, MED. 
& HEALTH CARE, 34 (1988). 
10. 5 Ca1.4th 84, 851 P.2d 776, 19 Cal. Rptr.2d 494 (1993). 
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first report on surrogate parenting. 11 Johnson forced us to confront directly 
the issue of the legal significance of gestation, and we recommended an 
addition to the Domestic Relations Law, stating that "[a]ny child born to a 
woman by means of artificial insemination or in vitro fertilization shall be 
deemed the child of that woman." 12 
This new recommendation was a logical extension of the recommenda-
tions in the committee's 1990 report. It established gestation as a legal 
determinant of maternity and provided guidance for judges who might be 
called upon to settle surrogacy disputes before the legislature had enacted 
explicit legislation regarding surrogacy. It also put the committee clearly in 
conflict with the approach in Johnson v. Calvert. While I will explain shortly 
why New York courts should not follow Johnson, we were unable at this 
stage to do more than recognize the difficulties of our legislative solution. 
When our 1992 report was originally presented to the Executive 
Committee and the House of Delegates in June, 1992, both bodies asked for 
clarification. The Executive Committee approved the report and its statutory 
recommendations, but the House of Delegates did not. Apparently, many 
delegates, who of course did not participate in our multi-year process of 
debate, were disturbed by the idea that a child could have "two mothers." 
This led to a number of interactions with others outside the committee whose 
professed interest in the welfare of the child with two mothers led me to ask 
whether there are in fact new categories of children. 
III. ARE THERE BIOTECHNOLOGICAL ClllLDREN? 
At this juncture, the committee realized that it needed to provide a fuller 
explanation of the uncertainties created by in vitro fertilization. Our 1992 
report was written prior to a new statute governing surrogate parenting 
11. Report on Surrogate Parenting of the Special Committee on Biotechnology 
and the Law (1989). 
12. For comparison, 1990 recommendations are underlined and 1992 recommen-
dations are in bold and underlined: 
§ 73. Parents of child born by anificial insemination or in vitro fenilization 
(1) Any child born to a woman by means of artificial insemination or in vitro 
fertilization shall be deemed the child of that woman. 
ill Any child born to a married woman by means of artificial insemination or in vitro 
fertilization performed by persons duly authorized to practice medicine and with the 
consent in writing of the woman and her husband, shall be deemed the legitimate, 
natural child of the husband and his wife for all purposes. 
ill The aforesaid written consent shall be executed and acknowledged by both the 
husband and wife and the physician who performs the technique shall certify that he 
had rendered the service. 
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contracts. 13 The 1993 report argued that our proposed legislative modifica-
tion was necessary because it would resolve issues left unanswered by the 
new surrogate parent contracting law. In addition, since our 1992 report had 
failed to consider how our statutory proposal for two mothers might affect 
New York trusts and estates laws, we recommended a modification of the 
New York Estates, Powers and Trusts Law. This final recommendation 
explicitly recognizes the female gamete donor as a parent when issues of 
lineage arise and in cases where uncertainty about legal parentage is created 
by the use of in vitro fertilization. 14 
The new statute on surrogate parenting contracts declares that "[s]ur-
rogate parenting contracts are ... contrary to the public policy of this state, 
and are void and unenforceable." 15 With this declaration, the legislature 
resolved many of the issues raised in various New York cases16 and in 
Johnson v. Calvert. Thus, judges in New York have clear legislative 
guidance about what not to do both in situations similar to the Baby M case 
in New Jersey and to the Johnson case in California. Since an agreement has 
no legal effect, courts may not establish parental status by reference to 
written or oral agreements entered into prior to the child's birth. 
While the statute definitively supports the birth mother's claim to parental 
status, it gives no such guidance as to the status of the genetic mother. 
Section 124 refers to disputes "between the birth mother and (i) genetic 
father, (ii) genetic mother, (iii) both the genetic father and mother. "17 It 
instructs courts not to consider the birth mother's participation in a surrogate 
parenting contract as adverse to her parental rights, status, or obligations. 
But it falls short of stating that the genetic mother is a parent. 18 Since the 
13. Article 8-Surrogate Parenting Contracts, N.Y. Dom. Rei. Law§§ 121-124. 
14. And when such uncertainty has not been resolved through a formal adoption 
proceeding, a judicial decree, or some other explicit legislative provision. 
15. N.Y. Dom. Rei. Law§§ 121-124, effective July 17, 1993. § 121(4) defines 
a "surrogate parenting contract" to mean "any agreement, oral or written, in which: 
(a) a woman agrees either to be inseminated with the sperm of a man who is not her 
husband or to be impregnated with an embryo that is the product of an ovum fertilized 
with the sperm of a man who is not her husband; and 
(b) the woman agrees to, or intends to, surrender or consent to the adoption of the 
child born as a result of such insemination or impregnation." 
16. For a discussion of the New York cases, see THIRD REPORT OF THE NEW 
YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE 
LAW: THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF GESTATION IN ASSISTED REPRODUCTION 6-10 
(1992). 
17. Under § 121, "genetic mother" is defined as "a woman who provides an 
ovum for the birth of a child pursuant to a surrogate parenting contract." A "birth 
mother" is defined as "a woman who gives birth to a child pursuant to a surrogate 
parenting contract." 
18. The practice commentary to § 124 notes the unresolved issue, stating that 
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statute does not confer parental status on the donor of the ovum, under 
existing principles it would appear that the genetic mother is not a parent. 
Of course, formal adoption proceedings would permit the genetic mother 
to be the legal mother, 19 but what happens when parties do not proceed 
with formalized adoption, either because they believe it unnecessary or 
because they are fighting over the child? A widely publicized case illustrates 
that people might believe it unnecessary to proceed with a formal adoption. 
A 53-year-old woman gave birth to a child from an embryo created with 
sperm from her son and an ovum from her daughter-in-law .20 There was 
no mention in the news story of any formal adoption proceedings by the 
daughter-in-law. 
In the bliss of the birth of a child, few of us think about the social 
dynamic set in place when the "genetic grandmother" is also the "gestational 
mother." What happens if there is a death, say, of the grandmother? Does 
this child born via assisted reproduction share equally with its genetic father 
(and the father's siblings, if any) if there is no will? If there is a will with 
certain provisions for the grandmother's "children" and other provisions for 
her "grandchildren," does this child inherit under both provisions or only 
one? From the perspective of family law principles, what status, if any, 
would the daughter-in-law have in a custody dispute if she and her husband 
divorce? If the husband sought primary custody on the grounds that he could 
provide for the young child with the assistance of the child's grandmother-
birth mother, would a judge have to rule that the genetic contribution made 
the wife a parent before deciding the custody issue? 
Most media discussion of assisted reproduction focuses on various notions 
of the biotechnological child's "best interests." But before one can consider 
the "best interests" question in a judicial proceeding, one must first 
determine who is a legal parent and thus able to seek custody. Our proposed 
legislation answers that question of parentage in such a way that courts and 
parties to a potential dispute, with the assistance of conscientious lawyers, 
can understand and take action to resolve the uncertainty inherent in the use 
of assisted reproduction. In effect, those using assisted reproduction may 
have to take some affirmative steps to insure that children receive the full 
"[w]hile the statute includes the genetic mother as a potential party to such a custody 
proceeding, it does not go so far as to grant the genetic mother standing to assert a 
custody claim." 
19. The commentary to the statute indicates that the legislature saw surrogate 
parenting agreements as specialized adoption proceedings. As such, the manner in 
which issues of parental status ought to be resolved by conscientious and ethical 
parties involved with assisted reproduction is through formalized adoption. 
20. When 'Mom' and 'Grandma' are One and the Same, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 
1993, at Bl. 
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protection that the law can provide. Parents of biotechnological children have 
different responsibilities than parents of children from non-assisted 
reproduction. While all parents have the same legal obligations, the parents 
of biotechnological children have the responsibility of removing the legal 
uncertainties surrounding their birth that society is unable to resolve at the 
present time. 
Our 1993 report suggested that the legislature modify § 73 of the 
Domestic Relations Law to read as follows: 
(1) Any child born to a married woman by means of artificial insemination 
or in vitro fertilization performed by persons duly authorized to practice 
medicine and with the consent in writing of the woman and her husband shall 
be deemed the legitimate, natural child of the husband and his wife for all 
purposes. 
(2) Except as provided in paragraph (I) above, any child born to a woman 
by means of artificial insemination or in vitro fertilization shall be deemed 
the child of that woman, and any child born by means of in vitro fertilization 
shall be deemed also the child of the woman who provided the ovum. 
(3) The aforesaid written consent shall be executed and acknowledged by 
both the husband and wife, and the physician who performs the technique 
shall certify that he had rendered the service. 21 
The proposed section contemplates that there will be two legal mothers 
in some situations. To cope with children born as a result of surrogacy 
arrangements and without subsequent adoption, the committee also proposed 
that § 2-1.3 of the Estates, Powers and Trusts Law should include the 
following new provision: 
26 
For all purposes under the Estates, Powers and Trusts Law, the sole mother 
of any child born through the process of in vitro fertilization shall be deemed 
to be the woman who donated the ovum, unless either 
(1) the creator expresses a contrary intention, 
or 
21. For comparison, the new language is underlined: 
§ 73 Parents of child born by artificial insemination or in vitro fertilization 
(I) Any child born to a married woman by means of anificial insemination or in vitro 
fenilization performed by persons duly authorized to practice medicine and with the 
consent in writing of the woman and her husband shall be deemed the legitimate, 
natural child of the husband and his wife for all purposes. 
(2) Except as provided in paragraph (l) above. any child born to a woman by means 
of anificial insemination or in vitro fenilization shall be deemed the child of that 
woman. and any child born by means of in vitro fenilization shall be deemed also the 
child of the woman who provided the ovum. 
ill The aforesaid written consent shall be executed and acknowledged by both the 
husband and wife, and the physician who performs the technique shall cenify that he 
had rendered the service. 
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(2) the mother who gave birth to the child is determined to be the sole 
mother of the child through formal adoption or judicial decree or 
pursuant to Section 73(1) of the Domestic Relations LawP 
This addition gives a clear rule for estate and trust planning that takes 
into account documents drafted many years prior to the passage of the 
surrogate parenting contract law. It strikes a balance between the views of 
those who believe that genetic birth should be determinative and the views 
of those who give priority to gestational birth. In our view, those individuals 
who created documents many years ago most likely were thinking of their 
lineage in terms of genetic connection. Couples who use reproductive 
biotechnological processes will be on notice through these provisions, the 
surrogate parenting contract law, and our proposed modification of § 73 of 
the Domestic Relations Law that they may have to take affirmative steps to 
ensure that their intentions in regard to their child are executed. As 
mentioned above, if the parties are in agreement, the intended mother should 
adopt the child in order to clearly extinguish the parental obligations and 
22. For comparison, new language is underscored: 
§ 2-1.3 Adopted children, posthwnous children, children born through assisted 
reproduction as members of a class 
(a) Unless the creator expresses a contrary intention, a disposition of property to 
persons described in any instrument as the issue, children, descendants, heirs, heirs at 
law, next of kin, distributees (or by any term of like import) of the creator or of 
another, includes: 
(1) Adopted children and their issue in their adoptive relationship. The rights 
of adopted children and their issue to receive a disposition under wills and 
lifetime instruments as a member of such class of persons based upon their 
natural relationship shall be governed by the provisions of subdivision two of 
section one hundred seventeen of the domestic relations law. 
(2) Children conceived before, but born alive after such disposition becomes 
effective. 
(3) Nonmarital children. For the purposes of this paragraph, a nonmarital 
child is the child of a mother and is the child of a father if the child is entitled 
to inherit from such father under section 4.12 of this chapter. The provisions 
of this paragraph shall apply to the wills of persons dying on and after 
September first, nineteen hundred ninety-one, to lifetime instruments 
theretofore executed which on said date are subject to the grantor's power to 
revoke or amend, and to all lifetime instruments executed on or after such 
date. 
(b) For all purposes under the Estates, Powers and Trusts Law. the sole mother of any 
child born through the process of in vitro fertilization shall be deemed to be the woman 
who donated the ovum. unless either 
(I) the creator expresses a contrarv intention, 
Q! 
(2) the mother who gave birth to the child is determined to be the sole mother 
of the child through formal adoption or judicial decree or pursuant to Section 
73(1) of the Domestic Relations Law. 
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rights of the other woman. Married couples using assisted reproduction with 
their own gametes or with donated gametes would not have to pursue an 
adoption because of the operation of proposed § 73(1). In the absence of a 
voluntary adoption, when the ovum of another woman is used, lawyers 
should draft trusts and wills with the understanding that genetics defines who 
is the mother of the child. 
Even though the legislature gave a clear preference to the birth mother 
in resolving custody disputes under § 124 of the Domestic Relations Law, 
we believe that the preference should shift to the genetic mother under 
Estate, Powers and Trusts Law. Parental status for the purpose of custody 
is distinct from parental status for the purposes of trusts and estates law, and 
the claims of the genetic mother and the birth mother are equally powerful: 
One claim is symbolized by the infertile couple who seek technological 
assistance and the help of another human being, usually a woman, in order 
to have genetically related offspring. As a general matter, this desire, not for 
"rights" in children but for the opportunity to assume important social and 
legal obligations to genetically related children, is a desire that law should 
encourage in all adults who choose to have children. On the other hand, 
biotechnological means of reproduction should not allow us to ignore the 
powerful claim and significance of the act of giving birth, not only in law, 
but also in our collective (perhaps Western) consciousness.23 
The committee's legislative proposals build upon the legislative policy 
prohibiting surrogate parenting contracts in two ways. First, the proposed 
modifications of § 73 address the consequences of the use of the procedures 
of assisted reproduction which we believe people will continue to use. 
Sections 121-124 address the process of making agreements about the 
transfer of parental responsibility, i.e., the process of surrogate contracting. 
Making explicit the parental status of both the genetic mother and the birth 
mother does not conflict with the policy statement in § 124 that the birth 
mother will not be disadvantaged by her participation in an agreement. 
Second, our proposed modification to the Estate, Powers and Trusts Law 
protects the intentions of most creators of trusts and wills (who, prior to the 
passage of the §§ 121-124, saw their future lineage in terms of genetic 
connections). 24 
Beyond this, our proposed modifications avoid the constitutional problems 
that might arise from a definitive legislative policy that uniformly favored 
either genetic or gestational birth. Our more cautious approach of dealing 
23. Second Report on the Legal Significance of Gestation of the Special 
Committee on Biotechnology and the Law 18 (1992). 
24. See In re Park, 15 N.Y.2d 413,207 N.E.2d 859,260 N.Y.S.2d 169 (1965) 
(Van Voorhis, J ., dissenting). 
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with issues one at a time while remaining child-centered is more likely to 
help society and the legislature resolve the many ethical and legal issues 
presented by assisted reproduction. 
CONCLUSION 
While the recommended legislation did not win the endorsement of the 
New York State Bar Association, the approach suggested here on a matter 
that has captured the public imagination since the celebrated Baby M 
surrogate parenting case is noteworthy. 
First, rather than pursuing a "rights" approach and considering every 
possible stakeholder as a rights holder, it asks institutional as opposed to 
individual rights questions. For example, I have asked if the approach of 
law-clearly an institution-to artificial insemination should be used to 
address in vitro fertilization. While constitutional doctrines supporting the 
right of a woman to an abortion are important in this inquiry, the committee 
did not begin with constitutional rights in mind. Our approach allows for a 
variety of conceptions of families within the law so that the parents of 
"biotechnological children" might have the same legal obligations as parents 
of coitally created children. The institutional inquiry assumes that families, 
however conceived, should be viewed as a private institution subject to a 
minimum of legal intervention. 
Second, and perhaps more important, our suggested approach, in general, 
proceeds with small-baby-steps towards regulations of reproductive 
technology. Medical practices will change rapidly, while legislative 
reform-where the basic legal structure of "family" is at stake-will proceed 
very slowly. We developed our questions from legislative solutions to earlier 
reproductive technologies and from judges working to resolve cases 
involving new reproductive technology. That our legislative recommendations 
were in conflict with the result reached by the California courts demonstrates 
the advantages of a wide variety of views on legal approaches to technology. 
Perhaps the views expressed here will help all states to examine their own 
approach to assisted reproductive biotechnology. 
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